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Multinational tax avoidance has been a subject of political discussion in recent years, as
there is growing evidence that multinational corporations (MNCs) pay little tax. The
political pressure has been exacerbated by the revelations from Panama and Paradise
papers in 2016 and 2017 that exposed details of some of the tax avoidance schemes to
the public. Despite efforts to curb such practices, with countries around the world
adopting various anti-tax avoidance measures and the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) championing the Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting (BEPS) initiative, the extent of profit shifting has been increasing over time.
Hence, it is unclear how effective these measures are. Even less is known about how
anti-tax avoidance measures affect business activities of multinational firms besides
profit shifting activities.
Profit shifting generally takes three major forms: debt shifting, transfer pricing and
patent reallocation. Allocating debt across different tax jurisdictions is one of the most
popular methods that MNCs use to lower their overall tax burden. A subsidiary of an
MNC can internally borrow money from its low-tax subsidiaries and reduce tax
payments by paying interest on that debt. Interest is tax deductible; hence, it reduces
firms’ taxable income. When these payments flow from high-tax countries to low tax
countries, this reduces firms’ overall tax bill.
In this paper, we answer the question of how anti tax-avoidance regulations are
affecting profit shifting of multinational firms. We consider the effects of a 2010 UK
reform that targeted debt-shifting. We find that following the reform, multinationals
reduce the amount of debt they hold in the UK. However, we also show that these firms
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move the debt that they held in the UK to other high-tax countries. This debt
reallocation is accompanied by real operations reallocations. Corporations affected by
the reform moved a share of their total assets and employment away from the UK to
where they locate their debt. Thus, this reform did not change their overall tax payment
and did not limit profit shifting, as intended. Instead, our paper provides novel evidence
on the ineffectiveness of such anti tax-avoidance regulations and on how multinationals
circumvent them.
Before the recent corporate tax rate cuts, the UK, with its 30% corporate tax rate in
2008, was considered a high tax country, thus a preferred location for debt holdings for
multinational corporations. In 2010, the UK introduced a “worldwide debt cap”, an anti
tax-avoidance reform that targeted firms with large debt holdings in the UK. The reform
disallowed interest deductions on excess debt for companies that had over 75% of their
total debt held in the UK. In this paper, we use the introduction of this reform to
consider how MNCs respond to anti tax-avoidance regulations. We compare debt and
real business operations of firms that crossed this 75% threshold to those with smaller
debt holdings before and after the reform.
We show that corporations affected by the reform reduced their debt in the UK by 74%
after the reform. We also show that at the same time, their debt holdings increased
abroad, especially in countries with high corporate tax rates. This is consistent with
shifting debt for tax-minimisation purposes. We show that this also led to the
reallocation of real operations. Multinationals affected by the reform reduced total
assets, fixed assets and employment in their UK subsidiaries by 7.5%, 11.4% and 3.9%
respectively. At the same time, they substantially increased their real operations in their
non-UK subsidiaries, especially in those to which they moved debt.
More extremely, we also find that MNCs adjusted their organisational structures to
offset the impact of the UK anti-tax avoidance measure. In particular, affected
corporations reduced the percentage of UK subsidiaries that were included in the
calculation of the UK debt. They also increased the percentage of subsidiaries in
countries with a higher tax rate than that in the UK, while reducing that in countries
with a lower tax rate. Taken together, these results show that the worldwide debt cap
affected corporations beyond their financing patterns, yielding real reallocation of
subsidiaries, assets and employment across borders. This suggests that the unilateral
introduction of tax avoidance regulations may hurt the size of operations and
employment in a country that introduces them.
We also find that multinationals with headquarters outside of the UK have more
flexibility than their UK counterparts in circumventing the UK anti tax-avoidance
policy. We find larger effects for foreign MNCs, both in terms of debt reallocation and
real operations reallocation. We find that because the UK headquartered multinationals
did not react as strongly to the reform, the worldwide debt cap actually raised the UK
tax payment from domestic multinational corporations, but not from foreign ones. One
implication of these findings is that the worldwide debt cap may have created a
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competitive disadvantage for domestic multinationals. Our analysis suggests that
international cooperation in matters of anti tax-avoidance policies is crucial to avoid
such unintended consequences.
This paper is the very first examination of the effectiveness of the “worldwide approach”
as a new anti tax-avoidance measure. Many countries have standalone rules that limit
multinationals’ borrowing, but the evidence on their effectiveness is mixed. The
worldwide approach is considered more difficult to circumvent, thus has been
recommended by policymakers and academics to complement existing rules. In
December 2017 the US passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in which similar limits on net
interest expense deductions of MNCs were put into effect. It is likely that more
countries will adopt the worldwide approach to tackle corporations’ tax avoidance in the
near future. Therefore, our findings have important implications for the current policy
debate.
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Notes:
This blog post is based on the author’s 2020 working paper “ Real Responses to
Anti-tax Avoidance: Evidence from the UK Worldwide Debt Cap”, with Yaxuan
Qi and Jing Xing, presented at the European Economic Association’s annual
congress, August 2020.
The post expresses the views of its author(s), not the position of LSE Business
Review or the London School of Economics. 
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